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ABSTRACT: Almost ten years have passed since the Arab uprisings of 2011 turned the social-political 
equilibrium of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region upside down. Despite successful counter-
revolutionary policies, protests continue to challenge the status quo. The main difference with the 2011 is 
that current and ongoing political and social protests are less “visible” as they happen at the “margins” of 
society. This paper investigates the role of marginality and marginalisation in the cycle of protests and the 
dynamic of revolution and counter-revolution in the MENA region. The continuous eruption of social 
contestations in the rural and urban margins of North Africa forces us to reconsider previous academic 
analyses which understood the so-called “Arab Spring” as a predominantly urban youth movement, 
principally from a middle-class background. Protests at the margins not only constitute the hidden history 
of revolts of 2011, they also continue these revolts in a less visible, less concentrated, and less articulated 
manner. Putting the margins at the centre of analysis allows us to conceive of a cycle of protest not only in 
diachronic terms, as a temporal ebb and flow of contestation, but also a socio-spatial process of 
converging and refracting protests – from the margins to the centre and back again. We take a closer look 
at events in Egypt and Morocco. For the Egyptian case we investigate rural and urban protests against the 
new Law on Building Violations. Through the lens of marginalisation, we are able to reveal the contours of 
a socio-spatial hierarchy of protests, which has been shaping social movements in Egypt long before 2011. 
The second case deals with Morocco and presents a counter-story of the post-2011 democratic transition 
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which has led, to everyone's surprise, to the uprising of the Hirak du Rif and Jerada. This counter-story 
traces the reconfiguration of power relations in society, thanks to mobilisations that took place often 
underground and at the margins.  
KEYWORDS: Margins - Protests - Morocco - Egypt – Dispossession 




1. Putting the Margins at the Centre  
 
A decade has passed since the Arab uprisings of 2011 turned the politics of the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region upside down. Despite successful counter-revolutionary strategies, new waves of mass 
revolt in Algeria, Lebanon, and Sudan have shown that the movement for social justice, freedom, and dignity 
has not yet exhausted itself. Even in those countries where popular insurrections appear to have abated, 
regimes are still confronted with political instability and social upheaval. The main difference with the 2011 
uprisings is that the current, ongoing political and social protests are often less “visible” as they happen at 
the “margins” of society. 
The eruption of social contestations in the rural and urban peripheries of North Africa has forced scholars 
to challenge academic analyses which understood the so-called “Arab Spring” solely or predominantly as an 
urban youth movement, principally from a middle-class background (Bayat 2013; Ayeb and Bush 2014). 
What is striking about these movements – in contrast to many experts’ predictions – is that they did not 
emerge from traditional political institutions such as parties, trade unions, and NGOs (Gause 2011; Zemni 
2013). Such organisations were either incapable of representing alternative and sustainable political solutions 
or were they overtaken by popular demands and pushed towards a more radical course (Catusse 2013; Rivetti 
2015). People coming from the impoverished rural and urban margins of society were, and still are, at the 
forefront of these movements (Rachik 2010, 2014; Bogaert 2015). It is therefore crucial that we revise and 
renew our analyses of the dynamics of contention and include “the margins” as important sites of political 
transformation and innovation (Tsing 1994; Bayat 2015; Martiniello 2015; Borras 2016).  
In this article we do not deploy “the margins”, “marginality” and “marginalisation” as strictly defined 
concepts, but as exploratory devices that allow us to ask new questions to existing case studies. Our main 
goal is not to present new fieldwork, but to reflect on these cases from the perspective of politics at the 
margins. The first case study opens with an investigation of the 2019-2020 protests in Egypt against the 
Reconciliation Law on Building Violations. We reject the notion that these rural protests are something new 
by disentangling the lineages of discontent in the countryside. We move on to workers’ and middle-class 
protest in the mid-2000s, which brings us to the spatio-hierarchical dimensions of the recent cycle of 
discontent in Egypt. We explain these dimensions in terms of processes of marginalisation. The second case 
offers a counter-story of the post-2011 “democratic transition” in Morocco. Since 2011, Morocco has 
experienced a series of social upheavals that shook the political system and revealed important shifts in the 
forms of resistance that protesters adopted as well as in the regime’s responses1. Through these two cases we 
place “the margins at the centre” of this analysis of the cycles of protest in the MENA. We discuss how the 
 
1 All data on the Moroccan case is based on Soraya El Kahlaoui’s doctoral thesis (2018). 
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balance of power is being reconfigured through the ongoing resistance of marginalised communities, the 
articulation of resistance by political opposition forces, and the concomitant (re)actions of the state. Such a 
triangular relation informs the repertoires, resources, and subjectivities of the actors involved in contentious 
politics.  
 
1.1 On Marginalisation 
 
Since the 1990s the concept of marginalisation has been taken up by anthropology (Tsing 1994). 
Marginalisation is not used to demarcate a site of exclusion or deviance from social norms, but to “indicate 
an analytic placement that makes evident both the constraining, oppressive quality of cultural exclusion and 
the creative potential of rearticulating, enlivening, and rearranging the very social categories that 
peripheralize a group’s existence” (Tsing 1994: 279). This anthropological interpretation helps us to 
understand how the ‘margins’ can also constitute a site of transformation, creating different forms of power 
within the global system. We want to reconnect this interpretation with the older political-economic 
literature on marginalisation, especially as formulated by Samir Amin (1976) in the 1970s. Here, 
marginalisation is understood in terms of the economic structure of the country and its relation to the global 
economy. While Amin originally developed his theory of marginalisation in the context of a (neo)colonial 
export sector restructuring the economies of the Global South, its application arguably extends to more 
recent transformations in the global capitalist economy. Global capitalist development consists of a 
continuous process of integration and exclusion of labour power. This generates specific social and 
ecological challenges for large sectors of the population that are excluded from new property relations. The 
breakdown of the developmental state through market liberalisation and privatisation went hand in hand with 
the exclusion of sections of the labour force, especially in the agricultural sector. The WTO Doha Round of 
2001 initiated such a moment of exclusion for traditional peasant farming in the Global South. The 
introduction of capital-intensive, export-oriented, commercial agriculture based on fertilizers, pesticides, 
quality seeds, mechanization, and access to markets exponentially increased the productivity gap between 
“advanced” and “traditional” farming, excluding smallholding peasants from the agricultural revolution 
(Amin 2003).  
Amin’s concept of marginalisation through processes of integration and exclusion can be connected to 
Bair and Werner’s (2011) more recent analysis of articulation and disarticulation of commodity chains. Their 
“disarticulation approach” focuses on “the reproduction of uneven geographies of capitalism as they relate to 
processes of incorporation and exclusion from global commodity circuits” (Bair and Werner 2011: 1000). 
They criticise the inclusionary bias in global commodity and value chain analysis, which presupposes that 
globalisation always entails growing participation and integration in economic networks and production 
chains. Instead, much like Amin, they point to practices of dispossession, disinvestment, and exclusion that 
go hand in hand with “development” and globalisation. Similarly, we argue that the transformations of 
global and MENA economies within that system have a direct effect on the political, social, and cultural 
exclusion of sectors of the urban and rural population from society. Since the 1980s, the policies of 
neoliberal dispossession and financialization have contributed to processes of marginalisation in the MENA 
(Ayeb and Bush 2014; Dillman 2001). The bread riots that took place in Morocco in 1981 and in Tunisia in 
1984 illustrate perfectly the process, as well as the resistance it generated in the region. 
Finally, marginality is related to processes of state formation and transformation. Although marginal 
communities are characterised by their exclusion from political and civil society and the “formal” economy, 
they nevertheless play an important role in state formation (Bellagamba and Klute 2008). Marginality does 
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not constitute a “borderspace”, but rather it recomposes the state by creating internal dynamics between 
marginalised communities and state institutions (Agier 2012). Organisations such as communities living in 
spaces of urban informality or in tribes co-constitute the state by establishing a permanent conflict over the 
law (Balandier 2013). This conflict over legitimacy implies that the state enters into a negotiation process 
that is always subject to the evolving balance of power between these communities and state institutions. 
Hence, processes of state formation, marginalisation, and resistance appear as the three key elements 
explaining cycles of contention. 
In this article we do not take the general political economy of marginalisation as our object of study. 
Instead, we zoom in on specific cases that reveal different dimensions of politics at the margins. We start our 
investigation of the Egyptian case study with the recent rural and urban protests against the Reconciliation 
Law on Building Violations. This leads us to comments on the often-invisible role of peasants in cycles of 
contention. Next, we discuss the role of middle-class and labour protesters in order to suggest a socio-spatial 
hierarchy of protests that is closely entwined with processes of marginalisation.  
 
2. Egyptians thrown into the streets 
 
On Sunday night 20 September 2020, protesters took to the streets in 17 different governorates in Egypt, 
demanding the departure of al-Sisi and an end to the Reconciliation Law on Building Violations, which 
would lead to fines and the demolishing of illegal housing in rural and urban areas. The protests pressured 
the government into delaying the implementation of the law until the end of 2020. Protesters also articulated 
their discontent with inadequate education, healthcare, infrastructure, and the rise of basic commodity prices. 
Mohamed Ali, the army contractor and whistle-blower whose widely shared videos about systemic 
corruption mobilised some two to three thousand protesters already in 2019, had called the protests. In his 
videos, Ali accused the al-Sisi family and army generals of using public money to build their own palaces. 
On 20, 21 and 27 September 2019, up to three thousand Egyptians had taken to the streets, calling for al-Sisi 
to resign. The protests were violently repressed with tear gas and live ammunition. In the biggest wave of 
arrests since 2013, some four thousand people were detained, among whom activists and opposition leaders 
who did not even participate in the demonstrations.2 Ali himself, who resides in Spain, was sentenced to five 
year in absentia because of tax evasion.3  
At first, Ali’s call to protest a year later, on the anniversary of the September 2019 demonstrations, was 
heeded by small groups of protesters only. On 25 September 2020 hundreds of people demonstrated in a 
“Friday of Rage” in Cairo, Giza, Damietta, Luxor, as well as several provincial towns and rural villages. At 
least 496 protesters were arrested.4 One protester was killed in al-Blida village in Giza.5 Another man was 
 
2  See: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200922-does-egyptian-army-contractor-mohamed-ali-really-have-a-magic-
wand/ 
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shot in the head in Luxor on 30 September after he castigated a police officer for beating his father.6 
Although the 2020 protests were smaller in scale than the 2019 ones, they lasted for several days.  
The main grievances of the Egyptian demonstrators revolved around the aforementioned Law on Building 
Violations, which threatened to demolish thousands of illegally-built homes, not only in shantytowns, but 
also in residential areas. Illegal housing is as much an urban as a rural issue, as people have squatted and 
built on agricultural reclamation land.7 Despite having previously regularised illegal land squatting in 2002, 
2006, 2010, and 2017, the state and especially the Ministry of Agriculture had attempted on multiple 
occasions to clear lands and evict squatters (El-Nour 2019: 554). In 2020, the government claimed that it 
wanted to stop the encroachment of housing on arable land and channel funds into much needed 
infrastructure and housing projects.8 However, there are almost no houses in poor areas that meet building 
regulations, especially in rural villages. By April 2021 more than two million reconciliation requests had 
been submitted for a total of EGP 16 billion in fees.9 Regardless of legislators’ intentions, the law appears as 
campaign to extort money from the lowest income groups. An optimistic estimate of poverty in Middle and 
Upper Egypt puts 55 to 67 percent of people in the Asyut and Luxor governorates respectively below the 
poverty line. This estimate was made before the disastrous economic impact of the covid-19 pandemic10 and 
the increase in the prices of electricity, drinking water, gas, and public transport.11 Most people cannot pay 
even the lowest fines of 50 EGP per square meter for illegal residential housing and 180 EGP per square 
meter for illegal shops and other commercial buildings.12 Moreover, in urban regions building licenses have 
been suspended since May 2020, which spells disaster for the income of about five million people who 
depend on the construction sector in Upper Egypt.13 Hence it does not come as a surprise that in the Atfeeh 
neighbourhood in Giza, clay brick manufacturers led the protests.14 
Although over the years unlicensed badly built or modified constructions have indeed resulted in fires and 
collapses, the current law appears as one of the state’s many attacks on Egyptians’ livelihoods since 2013, 
extorting fines and disciplining populations. Seven years after the 2013 coup, ordinary Egyptians have 
become poorer while the military elites have enriched themselves through osmotic public-private 
partnerships (Sayigh 2019). Furthermore, people do not have access to institutional venues to articulate their 
social grievances. Neither formal state structures, nor the old moral economy that was once in place (cf. 
Posusney 1993) offer ways to petition the regime, let alone to promote an alternative policy agenda. Since 
2013, al-Sisi has worked to consolidate the power of the state through the strengthening of the military and 
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Brotherhood-led presidency of Mohammed Morsi (De Smet 2016). After the presidential elections of 2014, 
however, his popularity and legitimacy plummeted. While externally the regime was stabilised by financial 
and diplomatic support from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, internally there was a process of 
“hegemonic contraction”, which “involves those moments when elites, for a variety of reasons, start to 
undermine existing forms of consent and sites of articulation, without replacing them with satisfactory 
alternatives” (Chalcraft 2016: 36). The current regime only conceives of political stability and social issues 
in terms of state security, leading to repression of political activism, critical journalism, strikes, and any other 
form of mobilization from below. This in turn magnifies the regime’s unaccountability to the general public, 
as highlighted by Ali’s condemnation of the regime’s corruption.  
 
2.1 The meaning of the demonstrations 
 
The protests of September 2020 did not represent a general uprising against the Reconciliation Law on 
Building Violations. Yet the significance of these demonstrations was not in the numbers of protesters. 
Firstly, observers pointed out that demonstrators were “breaking the barrier of fear”,15 even though they 
risked fines between 5,000 to 30,000 EGP and prison sentences just for participating in protests. Currently, 
there is no space for genuine political opposition to the regime, let alone for building a popular movement or 
street activism. Social media outlets are monitored and censored. Hence Egyptian activists are 
understandingly sceptical about calls for mobilisation that come from abroad, such as Mohamed Ali’s: 
people who spontaneously take to the streets would be crushed by the police. This leads to momentary 
explosions of popular anger without any real impact or movement-building strategy. However, the 
mobilisations showed to the larger population that even in the most adverse conditions protesting was still 
possible – and that the regime took it seriously. Discontent even turned directly against the figure of al-Sisi, 
with the tearing down posters of the president and chants of “Don’t fear, Sisi must walk” and “Go Balhah”16. 
By targeting al-Sisi, for the first time since the 2011 SCAF-led “transition”,17 the military stood at the centre 
of popular outrage. 
Second, unlike protests between 2014 and 2018, the demonstrations of 2019 and 2020 were national in 
scope, in the sense that they were organised in different localities all over the country. Moreover, observers 
were surprised to find the most militant protests in the countryside, and even nicknamed the events as a 
“Galabiya uprising” 18  in reference to the traditional rural dress. The independent advocacy platform 
Egyptwatch, for example, claimed that: “For the first time in decades, a popular movement began in Egypt 
from rural areas, which have previously been described by many political forces as stable and loyal to the 
ruling regime.”19 However, while Mubarak’s reign was characterised by a degree of hegemonic policies that 
attempted to incorporate tribal and village leaders and their interests into the state, the stereotypical view of a 
more or less static countryside before and after 2011 is problematic. This prejudice is itself an ideological 
 
15 https://www.aljazeera.com/program/inside-story/2020/9/27/can-protesters-achieve-political-change-in-egypt/ 
16 Balhah, meaning red dates, denotes someone who claims to be smart and wise but lacks these qualities. 
17 After Mubarak resigned, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces – i.e. military leadership – took over presidential executive 
and legislative powers to organise a democratic transition. 
18 https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20201001-egypt-police-kill-luxor-man-then-shoot-mourners-at-his-funeral/ 
19 https://egyptwatch.net/2020/09/30/why-did-the-egyptian-countryside-rise-up-against-al-sisi/ 
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product of the processes of rural marginalisation, which in turn reinforce this marginal position, hiding the 
role of peasants in the recent cycle of contention. 
 
2.2 Kick-starting the cycle of protest 
 
“Egypt’s peasants have been mostly absent from narratives about the ‘Spring’ of 2011”, Francesco de 
Lellis (2019: 583) underlines. They were invisible, not, of course, to specialised scholars or the involved 
communities themselves, but to the wider national and international civil and political community. Social 
(in)visibility is not only a function of the protests themselves, but also of their contexts: some protests are 
ignored or belittled and rendered invisible to those outside of the involved communities. The apparent 
invisibility of peasant struggles before, during, and after the revolutionary process led observers to the 
conclusion that peasants were at best passive, at worst rural auxiliary forces of Mubakarist reaction. This 
view harkens back to the time of the decolonisation struggle, when the native bourgeoisie, effendiyya 
(modern middle classes), and industrial workers were framed as the modernising forces against the “feudal” 
landlords and fellahin (peasants) (Beinin and Lockman 1987). Yet peasants in Egypt have a long tradition of 
resistance, going back to colonial and pre-colonial times (Chalcraft 2016). The liberalisation of agricultural 
prices and markets that began in 1987 provoked a new cycle of rural contention. The Egyptian government 
promoted “a US farm-type model of extensive capital-intensive agriculture driven by market liberalisation, 
export-led growth and tenure reform” (Bush 2007: 1604). The rationale of liberalisation was that rising 
prices of agricultural produce would attract domestic, regional, and international capital to invest in rural 
production. As small-holding peasants were seen as less productive, the state assessed that support to big 
landowners and large-scale farming was the appropriate way to conform to IMF-regulated free trade policies 
and cash crop production (Bush 2016). These policies pushed peasants to mobilise against the often-violent 
dispossession of their lands and other means of production by state-backed actors. The main provocation was 
Law 96 of 1992, which removed the price cap on land rents implemented by the Nasserist regime in the 
1950s. While in the past the Egyptian government had largely resisted the socially destabilising economic 
reforms that came with IMF loan packages, with the 1991 Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment 
Program it fully embraced neoliberal recipes to avert a financial crisis. This episode illustrates how processes 
of rural marginalisation in Egypt are closely entwined with global and regional political-economic 
restructurings.  
Before 1992 smallholding peasants had been subaltern allies of the broad regime coalition, offering their 
loyalty in exchange for rent control and protection of ownership rights. By the mid-1990s, half of the rural 
population lived in poverty, an increase of ten percent in comparison to 1990 (Mitchell 1999: 463). The 
attack on their means of existence forcefully shattered the rural moral economy, leading to protests in more 
than a hundred villages that took the form of “demonstrations, road blocks, sending telegrams to government 
bodies, organising about 200 ‘peasant conferences’ (…) and setting up ‘peasant committees’ (…) to resist 
the law” (De Lellis 2019: 586). Peasants forged connections with leftist activists from outside of their 
communities, ranging from journalists, NGOs such as the Land Center for Human Rights and its splinter 
groups, to party committees such as Tagammu’s (socialist party) Egyptian Peasants’ Federation. These 
activists organised solidarity meetings, informed the peasants about the Tenancy Law, gathered signatures 
for petitions, and attempted to unite the fragmented protests into a coherent social movement. However, in 
1997, when the law was actually implemented, leading Tagammu activists got cold feet, fearing an open 
confrontation with the Mubarak regime. They called off a mass protest of thousands of peasants in Cairo, 
which could have brought their plight at the forefront of Egyptian politics. This failure, in turn, resulted in 
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the collapse of the peasant movement and a return to forms of “everyday resistance” and individual survival 
strategies (De Lellis 2019: 587-8). By 2007 the violent repression of peasant resistance had resulted in “119 
deaths, 846 injuries and 1409 arrests” (Bush 2007: 1606), a rural drama that remained under the radar of 
most domestic and international observers. 
Protests by poor peasants – one of the most marginalised social groups in Egyptian society – had 
constituted the first step in the chain of contention that would lead to the 2011 uprising. Much more “visible” 
scenes of popular mobilisation took place a few years later in Cairo when middle-class activists gathered 
around the themes of anti-imperialism and democracy in the first half of the 2000s, leading to the 
establishment of Kefaya (Enough) in 2005, which politicised a new generation of urban youth. The rise of 
Internet activism facilitated political debates, the dissemination of information, and street mobilisation 
(Hirschkind 2011). The activists and networks that emerged from this civil-democratic movement played a 
key role in organising the first, small-scale demonstrations on 25th January 2011 (Joya 2011: 369). 
However, in addition to state repression and internal bickering, Kefaya lost momentum also because it 
could not mobilise beyond the social circles of urban students, intellectuals, professionals, and other middle-
class groups (Mackel 2012: 21). The movement failed to integrate its explicitly political, anti-Mubarak 
rhetoric with the social concerns of the urban poor, the working class, and the peasantry. After Kefaya, the 
centre of gravity shifted to industrial protests, with the movement of textile workers in Mahalla al-Kubra 
reaching its zenith (De Smet 2015). The protests in the state-owned textile sector reveal another type of 
marginalisation in the wake of neoliberal reform, which tried to solve inefficiency due to chronic 
underinvestment by cutting labour costs. The successful strikes of the Mahalla workers between 2006 and 
2008 encouraged workers in other industrial sectors and governorates to protest low wages, adverse working 
conditions, lack of representation, and the threat of privatisation, ranging from cement workers in Tura and 
Helwan, to Cairo subway drivers to bakers (Beinin and Al-Hamalawy 2007). Rural areas near industrial 
hotbeds such as Mahalla or Kafr al-Dawwar were also drawn to forms of collective resistance (De Lellis 
2019: 589).  
When Mahalla worker leaders planned a new strike on 6 April 2008, Cairo-based political activists, 
bloggers, and intellectuals seized on the event to call for a political “general strike” against the regime. The 6 
April campaign was organised partly in genuine solidarity with the Mahalla movement, which had impressed 
political activists. Yet political activists also hoped to use the 6th April strike as a springboard for reviving a 
nation-wide democratic movement against Mubarak. Their usurpation of Mahalla’s protests was legitimised 
by their observation that workers’ protests remained “economic” and “uncoordinated” (Shapiro 2009: 3) – 
thus in need of an external “push” to become a real force for change. Labour activists worried that the 
adventurist calls for a general strike, instead of support for the workers’ concrete demands, would provoke 
the state into harsh countermeasures, which was exactly what happened. On the day of the strike, security 
forces arrived to the factory before the workers. They locked them out and took over the machines (Al-
Hamalawy 2008). Internally divided, strike leaders decided to call off the strike and participated in street 
protests as citizens, shifting their demands to the high price of bread (Beinin 2011: 199). They were met with 
violence and the revolt was quelled. While there were some symbolic solidarity actions in other cities, in 
general the adventurist calls for a “mass strike” was not heeded and the Mahalla uprising remained isolated.20  
 
20 Interview with S.H., 12 November 2010, Mahalla, Cairo. 
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Nevertheless, the Mahalla strikes had a lasting impact on class-based and civil-democratic struggles. The 
protests initiated a wave of labour actions that engaged the whole Egyptian working class. Between 2004 and 
2010 some two million workers went on strike (Clément 2011: 71). Moreover, the workers’ movement 
began to formulate more general demands, such as a minimum wage, and it started organising in trade 
unions independent from the regime. Conversely, as a network facilitating communication between activists, 
the 6 April movement proved to be crucial in the lead-up to the 25 January 2011 uprising. However, the 6 
April movement, for example, failed to organise anything substantial on the ground until 2011.  
From peasant struggles in the 1990s over middle-class protests in the early 2000s to workers strikes in the 
late 2000s, these two decades did not entail a linear, incremental process leading to the 2010-2011 
revolutionary call of “we want the end of the regime”. The uprisings in the MENA were the result of a long, 
contradictory and uneven process of resistance, which was itself preceded by other historical episodes of 
social and political struggle (Abdelrahman 2014; Hanieh 2013; Chalcraft 2016). 
 
2.3 From revolts to revolution - and back to revolts 
 
The salience and velocity of the events of the so-called “Arab Spring” demanded a novel interpretative 
framework that went beyond the dominant paradigms of persistent authoritarianism, religious obscurantism, 
and political backwardness (Beinin and Vairel 2011). As the protests endured, international observers, 
domestic opposition figures, and even regime forces began to cast “the youth” as the prime actor of an 
“Internet revolution” against the regime. This representation of the revolutionary process and its supposed 
agent was not only rooted in an immediate, superficial reading of the unfolding events, but it also built upon 
an already existing narrative about the development of political opposition in Egypt, which overemphasised 
the significance of the “virtual activism” of a small group of educated, tech-savvy, upper middle-class urban 
youth (cf. Vargas 2012). 
Since the 25 January uprising, activists and scholars have criticised such a simplistic reading. Although it 
were indeed young men and women who initiated and spearheaded the protests (Al-Bendary 2011), the 
social composition of the protesting masses was not limited to young revolutionaries: “Protesters came from 
all walks of life – rich and poor, devout and secular, old and young” (Rashed 2011: 26). Defining the protests 
as merely an uprising of the youth narrows its scope and undermines its claims as a broad, popular 
movement (Winegar 2011). The image of the young revolutionary was a class stereotype, representing a 
particular youth: modern, urban, middle-class, and social media savvy, such as Google employee Wael 
Ghoneim – a typecast that, perhaps, reflected the predominant social composition of those who engaged in 
social media rather than that of the revolutionary actors themselves (Aouragh and Alexander 2011: 1355). 
The dissenting voices and interests of the rural, unemployed, poor, or uneducated young people were 
subsumed and homogenised under the catch-all category of “youth”. 
With regard to the notion of a “Facebook revolution”, critical scholars quickly pointed out that Facebook 
was one of the many tools for the organisation and mobilisation of protesters (Aouragh and Alexander 2011: 
1354). The roots of the revolution were traced back to the emergence of “political” and “economic” protests 
and movements during the past two decades, when human rights activists, anti-war protesters, students, 
political parties, radical NGOs, workers, peasants, and state employees assembled (Zemni, De Smet and 
Bogaert 2013). These real – as opposed to virtual – struggles created grassroots modes of collective action, 
networks, and resources that were successfully mobilised during the 25 January uprising.  
The bulk of the protesters during the 18 day-long uprising in 2011 consisted of the urban popular masses - 
unemployed youth, street vendors, small shopkeepers, housewives, taxi drivers, and wage laborers, – who 
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demanded not only freedom, but bread and social justice too (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014: 12). The 
demands of different class-based and civil-democratic movements, which have been active in the previous 
decade, were fused in the streets. While workers had joined the protests at first as citizens, they brought the 
insurrection back into their workplaces and communities. They began to strike and demonstrate as class 
actors, demanding a national minimum wage, steady employment of temporary workers, the 
renationalisation of privatised companies, and so on (De Smet 2015). 
In Cairo, the occupation of Tahrir Square not only became the symbol of the 25 January Revolution, but 
also a hub for “delegations” from various Cairo neighbourhoods, provincial towns, and rural areas to meet 
and organise. Representatives of four independent trade unions decided to constitute the Egyptian Federation 
of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) in Tahrir.21 In the square, workers and peasants “enjoyed the freedom 
to debate the strategy of the movement and the future of Egypt. Farmers were not able to return home when 
the regime closed the roads and joined in the protests at Tahrir” (El-Nour 2015: 203). And when they 
returned to their own communities, they shared and diffused their experience. Moreover, the defeat and the, 
at times faulty, organisation of state security apparatuses opened up spaces and opportunities for social 
contention. On a scale comparable only to 1997, peasants began to demonstrate for their rights and occupy 
lands that had been taken away from them. Most of the villages that rose up during those 18 days had already 
been at the core of the peasant movement in the 1990s (see De Lellis 2019). 
While the 18 days represented the apex of the civil-democratic movement, after the fall of Mubarak and 
the start of the SCAF-led “democratic transition”, class-based struggles intensified throughout the whole 
country. Workers began to set up their own trade unions vis-à-vis the factory management and the state 
union. Trade unionism became popular not only among the traditional industrial sectors such as steel, 
cement, or textile, but included “hospital doctors, mosque imams, fishermen, Tuk-Tuk drivers, skilled 
craftsmen, intellectual property rights consultants, daily-paid labourers and the operators of the ‘scarab 
boats’ that take tourists on Nile river trips” (Alexander 2012: 114-5). Moreover, their social struggle 
acquired a political dimension with the demand of tathir, the “cleansing” of the public sector and the state 
apparatus from the petty dictatorships of the “little Mubaraks” (Alexander 2012).  
While the workers’ movement blossomed in 2011-2012, in early 2011 after Mubarak’s departure, the local 
elites, their thugs, and state security forces quickly smothered the autonomous peasant resistance. Peasants 
could not rely on horizontal (between village communities) or vertical (between peasants and other social 
groups) networks of solidarity. External actors such as human rights organisations and political parties 
emphasised organising – especially unionisation and training – over movement-building. Some 700,000 
peasants joined one of the four independent umbrella farmers’ unions that emerged after the uprising (El-
Nour 2015: 203-4). Other actors such as Socialist Popular Alliance Party and the Egyptian Center for 
Economic and Social Rights preferred to support peasants “at the point of struggle”, by helping them to fight 
eviction politically and legally. By 2013, however, nearly all peasant unions had been closed down because 
of state repression, but also because of internal disputes in and between the federations, and the top-down 
bureaucratic and reformist approach to social change typical of most NGOs (De Lellis 2019: 593).  
Similarly, the workers’ movement split in the radical Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions 
(EFITU) of Kamal Abu Eita on the one hand, and the Egyptian Democratic Labour Congress of Kamal 
Abbas on the other hand. The EFITU ran out of steam, imploding because of infighting and the lack of 
 
21 Interview with K.A.E., 15 March 2011, Cairo. 
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logistical and financial capacity to connect with local autonomous unions and strike committees. The 
appointment of Abu Eita as Minister of Manpower in 2012 quickened the disintegration of the EFITU. The 
EDLC survived as an NGO-type organisation, offering training and services to its members. On 3 July 2013 
al-Sisi’s military coup paralysed the workers’ movement. On the one hand, workers tended to obey the call 
for social peace and economic stability, hoping that al-Sisi would improve their living conditions; on the 
other, they faced increased repression from a state apparatus that had regained its confidence.  
 
2.4 The uneven spatial dynamic of discontent 
 
This narrative of a decades-long social mobilisation in Egypt does not serve the purpose of simply 
showing that workers, peasants, and the urban poor did revolt on many occasions. It reveals important 
aspects of the cycle of contention that started in 1992 and ended in 2013. First, the cycle of contention 
clearly entailed spatially and socially different movements. The peasant struggle started the first phase of the 
1992 cycle of contention, which lasted until its defeat in 1997. An urban, middle-class movement followed 
from 2000 to 2006, ending with the collapse of Kefaya. The centre of gravity then shifted to the industrial 
working class in provincial cities such as Mahalla, Helwan, and Suez. The 25 January uprising united these 
different moments of the cycle in a single mass movement, initially led by urban, middle-class protesters 
with political demands (Kandil 2012). After the fall of Mubarak, the civil-democratic movement was 
gradually demobilised, but class-based struggles continued, especially among workers. Instead of a linear 
development of struggle, the cycle of contention appears as a reciprocal, “sideways” process as different 
movements continuously “fertilize” each other (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014: 13; Zemni, De Smet and 
Bogaert 2013).  
Second, the relative social “in/visibility” of specific groups and their demands indicates a hierarchy of 
protests, arranged along their spatial, social, and discursive characteristics.  
 
 
Table 1 Hierarchy of protests 
 
Visibility Geography Class Demands 
High Urban-metropolitan Middle class “Political” 
Medium Urban-provincial Industrial workers “Economic” 
Low Rural / urban-slums Peasants / poor “Economic” 
 
 
Our main hypothesis is that this hierarchy can be explained through the conceptual lens of 
marginalisation. Groups – such as peasants and slum-dwellers22 – that have been subjected to historical 
(postcolonial) and contemporary (neoliberal) waves of marginalisation have been made invisible in the 
 
22 Unfortunately, here we cannot investigate the role of the ashwaiyyat in the 1990s-2000s protests. 
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recent cycle of protest. Conversely, in mainstream accounts of the 2011 uprising and its preceding decade of 
struggle urban middle-class groups with purely civil-democratic demands (free elections, freedom of press, 
freedom of organisation, etc.) have been placed at the centre of the protests. Industrial workers in provincial 
cities such as Mahalla, Suez, and Helwan are an interesting case, as they have been only marginalised in 
recent decades. Before the 1970s in the framework of the post-colonial Arab nationalist developmental state 
and its ideology, industrial workers were regarded as a productive, modernising force as well as a pillar of 
society. While subsequent neoliberal reforms marginalised them socially, culturally, and politically, their 
historical prestige and contemporary relevance to capitalist accumulation has not been erased.  
 
3. Dispossession of housing and land in Morocco  
 
In this second part of the article, we turn to Morocco, the politics at the margins taking place there and its 
relevance to larger reconfigurations of power relations within the Moroccan society.  
In 2011, the 20 February Movement (F20M) was born in Morocco. In continuity with the Arab uprisings 
elsewhere, this movement radically criticised the process of reforms led by the king (Hibou 2011). The 
F20M denounced corruption and demanded social justice. It organised weekly demonstrations in Moroccan 
cities. As protests erupted throughout the country under the banner of the F20M, King Mohammed VI 
repositioned himself at the centre of the political scene. In his speech dated 9 March 2011, he announced 
constitutional reforms and democratic openings. Opting for a strategy of “royal democratisation”, the king 
refocused the political debate bringing himself at the core of it, capitalising on the legitimacy of the 
monarchy to stabilise the foundations of the regime. On 1 July 2011, the new constitution was ratified in a 
referendum. Following this, early legislative elections were held. This resumption of institutional political 
life marked a split within the movement. Although the official position of the F20M was to boycott the 
elections, many activists were persuaded that the institutional political game was too important to be ignored 
and boycotted (Badran 2020). For example, Karim Tazi, a Moroccan businessman, and one of the mediatised 
figures of the F20M, announced his intention to vote for the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD), 
the main party of opposition. On 25 November 2011, the PJD won the majority of parliamentary seats and 
the king tasked it with forming a government. For the first time, the PJD accessed executive power, under 
the impetus of a social movement that had paved the way for it. 
Contrary to many other countries in the MENA, which have witnessed violent contention between the 
government and the protesters, in 2011 Morocco underwent what was marketed by the monarchy as a 
“peaceful transition”. While lauded as a virtuous example by the international community for its ability to 
manage the crisis through constitutional change and electoral pluralism, Morocco showed signs of political 
instability on several grounds. For example, unnoticed by international observers even though transforming 
significantly the urban landscape, were the protests of el 'achwai, or the workers employed in informal 
economic sectors such as illegal constructions and street vendors. A day after the PJD’s victory, rumours 
about el bni tatlak, or the liberalisation of construction, began to circulate, suggesting that there was no need 
for authorisation to build a house or even subdivide a lot any longer. Morocco then rapidly witnessed a 
proliferation of bni el‘ achwai – informal housing – to the point that entire neighbourhoods appeared from 
anew in the cities’ outskirts. This phenomenon led to conflicts between the inhabitants of these new 
neighbourhoods and public authorities. However, such conflicts did not discourage dwellers, who kept on 
building illegal housing. In some cases, this resilience was celebrated. For example, one of the districts 
located on the outskirts of Agadir was renamed by its inhabitants “Derb bzzez” meaning “the district that 
imposed its presence” after the riot they led against the local authority (El Kahlaoui 2015).  
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The building of illegal settlements always entails some degree of violence. Such conflicts unfold 
following a script which includes a set of rules and negotiations between the inhabitants and the authorities 
they challenge. In this sense, the practice of informal construction mirrors the shifting balance of power 
regulating the relation between the street and institutional political power (Bayat 2009). The 2011 wave of 
protests involved new forms of appropriation of the public space too, ranging from self-construction to 
illegal trade. In Morocco, citizens monopolised the street for two consecutive years (2011-2012) to the 
detriment of state power and its regulations.  
Yet, since 2013, the state re-appropriated such illegal spaces. To do so, it outlawed self-built construction 
and proceeded to exclude self-built neighbourhoods from the provision of public services. After tipping the 
balance of power to its advantage, the state resumed its “normal” activities and, in particular, its role as the 
facilitator of private investments. The year 2014 was thus marked by the launch and implementation of 
major urban projects. Indeed, many of such projects – notably those concerning the Rabat-Casablanca 
metropolitan axis – had been put on hold during the 2011-2013 crisis, characterised by the social tensions 
that the evictions necessary to implement these projects had created. Although Morocco won the UN-Habitat 
award in 2011 for its Villes Sans Bidonvilles program, between 2011-2013 the country had fallen behind the 
objectives it had set for itself.  
Being committed to modernisation, Morocco is experiencing a high rate of urbanisation, like other 
countries in North Africa. The city – erected as a showcase of modernity – takes shape following 
international standards which are however used as a pretext to privatise non-regulated land reserves such as 
slums, informal or communal habitats and collective land (Bogaert 2018). Thus, inhabitants are expelled 
from their shantytown to make room for mega-projects such as the redevelopment of the Bouregreg and the 
waterfront of Rabat. The Bouregreg project, with its luxury residential units, marinas, new shopping 
facilities, is a salient example of how the contemporary city is perceived as the primary motor for economic 
growth and how cityscapes are redesigned and restructured to satisfy the desires and interests of (global) 
capital, as Bogaert (2018) argues.  
Since late 2013, a number of historic shantytowns in Casablanca – Carrières Centrales, Douar Krimat, 
Schneider – were subject to eviction procedures. These evictions were carried out with brutality yet faced a 
strong opposition by the residents, who refused to leave the area. The most striking resistance came from the 
inhabitants of Carrières Centrales in June 2014. The violence the state employed to evict the residents was 
mediatised and shocked part of public opinion. In particular the image of one inhabitant threatening to set 
himself on fire while on the roof of his house to stop the arrival of the police, widely circulated in the media 
and caused public outcry. During another slum evacuation, a woman expelled from Douar Krimat in 
December 2013 built a makeshift camp in the street for her and her five children. She wrote on a banner: 
“Those who have no housing, have no homeland, my ID number is BH00000”.  
In Rabat, eviction procedures were also enforced. In February 2014, state security destroyed the houses of 
residents of Ouled Dlim Douar, located on the agricultural land of the Guich Oudaya tribe. More than 36 
homes were demolished, leaving residents without resources (El Kahlaoui 2017b). In March, the security 
forces intervened in Drabka Douar, also located on the land of the Guich Oudaya tribe, to destroy vegetable 
and fruit stalls. The case of the inhabitants expelled from Ouled Dlim Douar is not an isolated case in 
Morocco. Since 2004, Morocco has embarked on a policy of privatising land property. In this context, 
collective land, which is now estimated to be around 12 million hectares, is the first target of these 
liberalisation policies. The grabbing of land by private developers is part of the economic cycle connected to 
major urban projects. It destabilises the livelihood of rural populations, whose resources come directly from 
the exploitation of that very land. Thus, expropriation and liberalisation are often met with resistance. 
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Concomitantly to the mobilisation of Douar Ouled Dlim, the mobilisation of Douar Sbita, located in 
Bouknadel in the outskirts of Salé, was organised a few miles away. The lands of the Douar Sbita are 
collective lands, and they are governed by the dahir23 1919, which places them under the control of the 
Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry can cede them for public interest. In 2007, the property of these lands 
was transferred to a powerful property developer, Addoha, for the construction of a luxury real estate project. 
By the sea, the “Plage des Nations” project covers 500 hectares and includes a luxury seaside resort with 
apartments, villas as well as an 18-hole golf course. Not consulted during the negotiations for compensation, 
the residents of Douar Sbita said they were cheated. Furthermore, women and single men are excluded from 
any compensation. Since 2014, Saida, a woman who led the movement of the inhabitants of Douar Sbita, has 
organised a weekly Sunday protest to demand compensation. Today, part of the neighbourhood has been 
destroyed but the movement is still ongoing. 
 
3.1 Dispossession as development  
 
The struggle against expropriation, the privatisation of resources, and for the right to self-construction and 
trade – whether made illegal by the authorities or not - does not constitute, to use the words of Mohammed 
Mahdi, an “epiphenomenon” in Morocco (Mahdi 2018). As he points out, the question of land grabbing, 
including the privatisation of surface and underground resources, is a global phenomenon, leading to 
localised resistance from the population affected by the dispossession process. These mechanisms of 
dispossession, of which the rural populations fell often victim, must be connected to the struggles taking 
place in urban areas around the right of appropriation of space (Kipfer 2019). Urban or peri-urban struggles 
are not removed from struggles in the rural world. The issue of land dispossession, the right to resources and 
efficient public services go beyond the urban/rural dichotomy. While urban, peri-urban and rural populations 
often struggle for the same reasons and demand similar rights, the rural margins are able to mobilise more 
structured and militant networks, especially when such rural and marginalised communities share a strong 
common identity. This is the case for ethnic minorities and, in Morocco, the Amazigh population in 
particular. 
The mobilisation of the Amazigh people served as a platform to create a common set of demands and to 
bring together many micro-mobilisations scattered throughout the territory. In August 2011, the now famous 
movement of Imider, a small rural municipality located in the Tinghir Province in the South East of 
Morocco, set up a camp on the Mount Albban and interrupted the provision of water to the construction site 
of the mining company Managem, which belongs to the royal holding Al Mada (Benidir 2017; Bogaert 
2018b). This mining site is one of the biggest in the whole African continent. Today, Imider constitutes a 
symbolic struggle because it represents a multitude of scattered, small-scale rural struggles that are 
structured around Amazigh networks and mobilised around the question of the right to resources. In fact, 
since 2011, a multitude of micro-mobilisations for the right to land and resources took off, diverging from 
the more institutional trajectory taken by the F20M. Such rural community-based micro-mobilisations 
anticipated the Hirak in the Rif, which exploded in 2017 (El Kahlaoui and Bogaert 2019; Chapi in this 
Special Issue). 
 
23 A dahir is royal decree. 
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Between the beginning of the F20M and the Rif’s Hirak movement of 2017, numerous mobilisations 
broke out all over the territory. While each had its own specific forms and demands, relevant to different 
circumstances, they all represented the struggle of marginalised communities against major state-led 
development projects, and demanded an equitable share of wealth and the right to land and resources, to 
housing, and to local development. Such mobilisations are linked to the development policies implemented 
in the country (Bogaert 2018). Morocco suffers from strong disparities in wealth and presents significant 
development inequalities between territories, in spite of the efforts that governments have made in the past 
through large programmes such as the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH) or the Cities 
Without Slums (VSB) (Berriane 2010; Bogaert 2013). While contributing to an official reduction in the 
poverty rate (15.3% in 2001 to 4.8% in 2014), the implementation of major projects created development 
niches that do not benefit local communities at large and their development. Sometimes, they accentuated 
territorial imbalances. For example, in February 2016, King Mohammed VI inaugurated the first phase of 
what will become the largest solar energy project in the world: the Noor project (Cantoni and Rignall 2019). 
Solar energy represents a new “frontier resource” but it is in direct conflict with the interests of the local 
communities living in the territories where the project will be developed. The access to water of the local 
population has been jeopardised, and conflicts have erupted between national authorities and local 
communities (Bergh and Rossi Doria 2015). These major development projects fail to reach the standard of a 
proper national development strategy that equally values livelihoods in marginalised territories and 
metropolitan areas. On the contrary, they discriminate against marginalised territories and have worsened the 
conflicts between local communities and the state (Ayeb and Bush 2019; Bogaert 2015). Since 2016, the 
proliferation of major social movements fighting against development projects, such as the Hirak du Rif, 
Jerada or Zagora, signals a crisis of the state’s development policy. Water stress, land dispossession, the 
overexploitation of mining and fishing resources, but also social and economic tension due to the accelerated 
urbanisation of Morocco, are causing an upsurge of social mobilisations by marginalised populations against 
the state. 
 
3.2 Rise and Repression of the Rif’s Hirak 
 
It is in this national context that in April 2017 the Hirak of the Rif emerged. This movement originated by 
the death of Mohcine Fikri, a fish seller who was crushed by a dumpster while he tried to recover his 
merchandise, an illegal swordfish that was confiscated by the local authorities. Causing an unprecedented 
wave of indignation, Al-Hoceima, Fikri’s town of origin, became the core of street protests demanding better 
access to public services and resources. The mobilisations spread throughout the country quickly. Rallies 
were organised throughout Morocco to pay tribute to Fikri’s memory, denouncing the increasing social 
inequalities in the country. However, despite the scale of the initial mobilisations, at first sight the protests 
appeared to be stifled. Indeed, the media – busy with reports from the 2016 COP22 meeting in Marrakech – 
did not pay any attention to the Rif. In the eyes of the general public, the case of Mohcine Fikri's death 
appeared to have been quickly shelved away (El Kahlaoui 2017). 
Yet during this time, silently and for months, the Hirak movement was gestating. Street politics in the Rif 
has a long and rich genealogy. During the colonial period, the Rif region was known for its resistance against 
European penetration and for its participation in the liberation struggle at the time of national independence. 
From this struggle hailed the famous figure of Abdelkrim El Khattabi, an independence fighter who later 
became an opponent of the Moroccan monarchy, which he considered complicit with colonial power (Aidi 
2017). Condemned to exile in Egypt, El Khattabi continued to assert the need to decolonise Morocco and 
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achieve effective independence (Daoud 2020). After his death in 1963 in Cairo, El Khattabi’s words 
continued to resonate in the Rif, which became a bastion of resistance against the authoritarian rule of King 
Hassan II. The Rif paid dearly for this opposition. In 1984, during the “years of lead”24, King Hassan II very 
harshly addressed his opponents in a speech, describing the Rif in particular as “waste” or awbach. The 
Awbach, or the unemployed, are those who live on smuggling and theft, he said.25 Years of repression and 
economic marginalisation followed the monarch’s address. 
The legacy of this resistance and marginalisation is alive in the Rif (Naimi 2020). Certainly, the political 
and economic context has changed. At the start of his reign, Mohammed VI had begun a process of 
reconciliation with the Rif region through a policy of investments. However, Hirak considers these 
investments to be insufficient and unproductive for the region. Indeed, caught in the neoliberal process, 
Morocco has embarked on development based on foreign investment and privatisation, which often increase 
inequalities and deprive the local population of its right to resources. The Rif has seen the quasi-totality of its 
fishing resources exploited by large foreign companies. Artisanal economic fishing activities have nearly 
disappeared. Local fish has become inaccessible to the population. Furthermore, such investments have not 
resulted into more employment opportunities for the local population, causing very high rates of youth 
unemployment. 
On 26 May 2017, as a turning point in the crackdown against the Hirak and its activists, the Moroccan 
authorities arrested Nasser Zefzafi after he interrupted a prayer ceremony at a mosque in Al-Hoceima to 
protest the state’s manipulation of religion and the preacher’s anti-Hirak propaganda (Hamoudi 2019). The 
arrest of the Hirak leader spawned an unprecedented wave of arrest against Hirak activists, blogger, 
journalists and protesters. Indeed, between 26 and 31 May 2017, Moroccan authorities arrested more than 71 
people in the Rif region. According to Amnesty International26 and Human Rights Watch27 over 400 people, 
including minors and women, were arrested during this one-off wave of arrests. More than 50 political 
prisoners, among them the Hirak’s leaders, were transferred to the Oukacha prison in Casablanca awaiting a 
mass trial. A group of activists were put in a helicopter blindfolded. Some of the activists told their lawyers 
that during the journey, police forces threatened to throw them out the helicopter if they did not accept to 
cooperate. Once in Casablanca, the activists were sent to the headquarters of the National Criminal Police 
Brigade for interrogation. During this wave of arrests, the political prisoners were beaten, threatened with 
rape and subjected to police violence (Rhani et al. 2020). Moreover, Nasser Zefzafi was placed in solitary 
confinement for over a year in an empty wing of Ain Sbaa Prison, with access to the promenade yard only 
for half an hour, twice a day. The trial of 53 Hirak activists who were transferred to Casablanca started in 
September 2017 four months after their arrest. Most of the evidences presented and held against them were 
Facebook posts, articles written by some of the arrested journalists and videos and photos of them at 
demonstrations. Facebook posts brought as evidence against the prisoners included critiques of the state’s 
discriminatory developmental policies, the Rif’s marginalisation, state oppression, the militarisation of the 
territory and of the arrest of activists, or called on the people of the Rif to participate in the protests (El 
 
24 The “years of lead” refer to a period of massive repression during Hassan II’s reign. 
25  See the discourse of King Hassan II on 22 January 1984, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lNHR7Zh5QR4&t=5s 
26  See https://www.amnesty.be/infos/actualites/article/maroc-il-faut-liberer-les-manifestants-les-militants-et-les-journalistes-
places  
27 https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/05/morocco-king-brushes-evidence-police-abuse  
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Kahlaoui and Yousfi 2020). In June 2017, the court sentenced all 53 prisoners to sentences ranging from 1 to 
20 years of imprisonment and fines. The charges held against them involved harming the state’s internal 
security, criminal arson, rebellion, attacking police officers while performing their duty, damaging public 
property, and staging unauthorised protests. 
The heavy and brutal state repression of the Hirak marked a turning point on the Moroccan political scene. 
Different political parties and civil society actors began to mobilise, demanding the immediate release of all 
political activists arrested during the Rif uprising and an end to the militarisation of the region. Moreover, 
this unprecedented wave of arrests led to the emergence of an international solidarity movement with the 
Hirak’s political prisoners and demands for justice (El Kahlaoui 2017; Bousetta 2018). 
 
3.3 The politicisation of the Hirak 
 
While these prison sentences shocked the public opinion, who feared a return to the “years of lead”, it is 
important to highlight the relation between the severity of the sentences and the claims of the Hirak. The 
Hirak demanded the “lifting of the economic blockade and an end to marginalisation” of the Rif region, 
describing the latter as a “policy of revenge” implemented by the state since the Rif revolts (1957-1959). The 
Hirak centres the political history of the Rif and the Amazigh identity in the analysis of the economic 
exclusion the region suffered (Masbah 2017; Mouna 2018; Esmili 2018). Most of the demands the Hirak put 
forth relate to economic and social justice. Apart from demands for better public services (education, health), 
the vast majority of other demands focus on the right to resources and autonomy over the management of the 
region’s resources. It is important to emphasise that these demands, which formally are less political than 
those made by the F20M, led to a deeper destabilisation of state structures. It was on the basis of socio-
economic demands and of entirely peaceful demonstrations that the Hirak was judged to be a separatist 
movement undermining internal security and the integrity of the state (Wolf 2019). The political upheaval 
that the Hirak of the Rif caused, mirrors the conflicts underlying the construction of the Moroccan modern 
state. This process of state formation has generated a profound conflict between on the one hand, a 
population (still) structured along tribal lines and the question of Amazigh identity, and, on the other hand, 
the central state which declared itself, in the name of a legal modernism inherited from the colonial period, 
the legitimate owner of tribal territories and their resources. This explains why the repression of the Rif 
Hirak has not quieted the wave of social protests in the country.  
The crisis – which is both institutional and social– appears to have become a permanent feature of 
Moroccan politics (Batten-Carew et al. 2017). Indeed, in October 2017 mobilisations resumed, particularly 
in Zagora (South East of Morocco) where the inhabitants took to the streets demanding their right to water. 
Severely repressed, this mobilisation has been mediatised not only in the press but also through social media. 
Then, in December 2017, the Hirak of Jerada too broke out. A former mining town in decline, Jerada’s 
protest movement is similar to the Rif’s Hirak. While the trials against the leaders of the Rif’s Hirak in 
Casablanca were hitting the headlines, on 22 December 2017, in Jerada, a mining town in the East, two 
brothers, Houcine and Jedouane Dioui died in the collapse of a well caused by a water leak in a coal 
mine. Like Mohcine Fikri's death, this news triggered an uprising in the town of Jerada. Inhabitants 
gathered to form a human chain in front of the morgue to prevent the authorities from burying the two bodies 
before opening an investigation. For months thereafter, Jerada became the stage of massive demonstrations 
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against socio-economic marginalisation. Like in the Rif, Hirak activists in Jerada were arrested. According to 
Human Right Watch, in May 2018, 69 protesters were charged.28 Their prison sentences, which were less 
severe than those inflicted to the activists in the Rif, range from 2 to 4 years in prison. Similar to the political 
prisoners of the Hirak du Rif, some of the Jerada detainees were released by royal grace in 2019. The Jerada 
social movement did not run out of steam and significantly weakened the authorities’ political power. 
The emergence of al-Hirak al-Sha’bi (Popular Movement) in the Rif at the end of October 2016 and its 
subsequent growth at the regional and even national level highlighted the maturation of what could be called 
a “movement of the margins” (El Kahlaoui and Bogaert 2019). Telling this counter-story highlights the 
reconfiguration of power relations between the centre and the periphery, building on the analysis of the 
mobilisations that took place at the margins. The communities living at the margins are diverse and include 
inhabitants of informal urban settlements as well as rural populations struggling for the right to land and 
access to resources. By destabilising existing relations of power, such movements of the margins question 




The Egyptian and Moroccan cases show that the often microscopic and seemingly non-political conflicts 
at the edges of society are directly interwoven with global and regional transformations. Instead of focusing 
on the broader political-economic context of these processes, we have highlighted the forms of social 
contention that have originated precisely “at the margins” of society: those spaces and groups that have been 
excluded by processes of dispossession and disinvestment. At the same time, the gradual accumulation of 
these protests and the networks and repertoires of action they forge, have propelled movements in the (urban, 
middle-class) centre into action and/or offered these movements a larger social base (from which) to 
mobilise. Protests at the margins not only constitute a largely hidden history of the revolts of 2011 in Egypt 
and Morocco. They also continue these revolts in a less visible and less concentrated manner than the 
preceding “democratic” demonstrations and uprisings in metropolitan urban centres.  
Putting the margins at the centre of analysis has allowed us to conceive of a cycle of protest not only in 
diachronic terms, as a temporal ebb and flow of contestation, but also as a socio-spatial process of 
converging and refracting protests, from the margins to the centre and back again. Finally, we highlighted 
the uneven and hierarchical character of these socio-spatial dynamics. The social “invisibility” of protest 
movements in Egypt and Morocco is an effect of implicit and explicit processes of marginalisation. While 
these movements are crucial links in the chain of protests, their social invisibility poses political and ethical 
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